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ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: TRAPS FOR
THE UNWARY
Margaret L. Mosest
Ethics in international arbitration is a complex subject. A number of factors
contribute to this complexity, including, first, the likelihood that lawyers in-
volved in arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction may be subject to more than one set
of ethical rules. Moreover, those rules may not just be different, but may be
inconsistent or even incompatible.' Thus, it may be impossible for an attorney to
comply with the two or more different sets of rules. It is important to remember
that in most international arbitrations, a minimum of three jurisdictions will have
potentially applicable rules. The parties are each from a different country-that is
what makes the arbitration international-and the parties usually choose to have
the hearing in a third, neutral country, which is the seat of the arbitration. There-
fore, each of these three jurisdictions may have an interest in the ethical conduct
of the attorneys.
A second factor is the lack of clarity about what particular rules may govern
attorney conduct in an international arbitration and how the determination of the
appropriate rules should be made. One possibility is that the governing rules
should be the ethical rules from the jurisdiction where the attorney is licensed. If
that were the case, however, then because the attorneys are likely to come from
different jurisdictions, they would be subject to different rules, which would tend
to create an uneven playing field. A second possibility is for all attorneys to be
subject to the rules of the jurisdiction where the arbitration takes place. While
this might appear to level the playing field, nonetheless the national ethical rules
in a particular jurisdiction are intended to deal with local lawyers practicing do-
mestically and may not be particularly appropriate for international dispute reso-
lution. A third possibility is that the ethical rules should be the rules laid down by
the particular tribunal. If that appears to be the best solution, then the inevitable
question is whether tribunals actually have the power to impose ethical rules on
attorneys. Can the rules of the tribunal override the domestic ethical rules of the
jurisdiction where the arbitration is being held, as well as the national ethical
rules from the home country of the different attorneys?
t Margaret L. Moses is Professor of Law and Director of International Programs at Loyola Uni-
versity Chicago. The second edition of her treatise on international commercial arbitration was published
in May 2012 by Cambridge University Press. Professor Moses heads Loyola's Vis Moot Arbitration
program, which sends students to compete in both Vienna and Hong Kong. She has a J.D. degree from
Columbia University School of Law and a Ph.D. degree from Indiana University.
I See, e.g., Catherine Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing A Code of Conduct for
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. IrNr'i L. 341, 345-46 (2002) ("[I]nternational attorneys remain
subject to often conflicting professional obligations."); Siegfried H. Elsing, Ethical Issues in Interna-
tional Litigation from a German Perspective, ARTIGOS JURIDICOS INTIURNACIONAis, http://www.camarb.
com.br/areas/subareasconteudo.aspx?subareano=42 (last modified 2005) ("[R]egardless of... in which
country the foreign lawyer is admitted, he has to observe both the German professional rules and the
rules of his home country.").
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A third factor affecting attorney ethical conduct concerns who should be regu-
lating or enforcing ethical rules in this international context. Should it be the
licensing authorities, the bar associations, or the courts in the jurisdiction where
the attorney is licensed? Or should it be similar authorities in the jurisdiction
where the arbitration takes place? Or should the regulating or enforcing authority
be international organizations, institutions, or the tribunal that is presiding over
the arbitration?
As a framework for dealing with ethical complexities in international arbitra-
tion, it is important to consider the purpose of ethical rules. Rules of ethics are
supposed to provide parameters for lawyers in making appropriate ethical choices
in the conduct of their work, decision-making, and behavior. The rules should
promote high standards of conduct and help preserve professional integrity. A set
of ethical rules tends to work pretty well to accomplish these goals in a homoge-
neous legal and cultural environment, but tends to work less well when very
different legal cultures come together, as they do in an international commercial
arbitration. The concern of ethical rules is to protect and guard the integrity of the
profession. They are not supposed to be interpreted in a way that provides an
advantage to one side or a disadvantage to the other.
So how can lawyers find and follow the proper ethical path when different
legal and cultural backgrounds cause clashes in ethical rules? Legal norms and
associated ethical rules may collide, for example, in some of the following areas:
1. Preparation of witnesses for testimony, which is precluded in some
jurisdictions, but considered an obligation in others. 2
2. The issue of privilege for certain documents, and confidentiality of
communications with the client, which exist for in-house counsel in some
jurisdictions but not in others.3
3. The obligation to produce documents, which is required in some juris-
dictions but forbidden by blocking statutes in others.4
4. The obligation of confidentiality of settlement discussions. In the U.S.,
an attorney is obliged to communicate any settlement proposal to a client
while in other jurisdictions the attorney may be prohibited in certain cir-
cumstances from disclosing such information to a client.5
2 Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of Advocacy in International Arbitration, in The Art of Advocacy
In International Arbitration 49, 52 (Doak Bishop & Edward G. Kehoe eds., 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1559012; Judith A. McMorrow, Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in International
Tribunals: A Case Study of the ICTY, 30 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 139, 142 (2007).
3 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 52-3 (explaining the significant national divergences regarding disclo-
sure of certain documents, such as requiring non-privileged document disclosure in the United States,
while in other jurisdictions having no requirements regarding this type of disclosure).
4 Catherine A. Rogers, Lawyers Without Borders, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1035, 1084 n.155.
5 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 53 (pointing out that a French attorney may be ethically required to
keep confidential from his own client a settlement proposal by opposing counsel, whereas U.S. ethical
rules mandate disclosure to the client of any such settlement proposal).
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5. The obligation to report client perjury to the tribunal. An attorney from
the U.S. may have such an obligation,6 but attorneys from other jurisdic-
tions may have an obligation not to disclose such information. 7
6. The obligation not to have ex parte communications with a member of
the tribunal. In the U.S., such communications with a member of the tri-
bunal are prohibited, whereas in other jurisdictions, such as Germany,
they may be permitted.8
7. The question of who may appear as a fact witness. Some jurisdictions
prohibit a party from being a witness. 9
8. The obligation not to present as fact to the tribunal statements not sup-
ported by any known evidence. In some states, such presentations by
counsel are permitted.' 0
In dealing with these various situations, some arbitration tribunals, interna-
tional rules, and national rules have tried to level the playing field among the
parties and have succeeded to some extent, but a myriad of problems still exist.
However, focusing on all of these areas is beyond the scope of this article. This
article will concentrate on just one of the situations referred to above-witness
preparation. In particular, this article will deal with the application of Rule 8.5 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to witness preparation in an interna-
tional context.
In the United States, lawyers spend a great deal of time, effort, and energy
preparing a witness to testify. An American attorney who did not prepare her
witnesses carefully would be considered quite remiss." In other jurisdictions,
however, an attorney may be prohibited from even interviewing a witness prior
to that witness providing testimony.12 If each attorney follows the different rules
of her home country, there could be substantial differences in the performances
of the witnesses, possibly giving an advantage to the side that had expended more
effort to prepare the witness. If, on the other hand, the tribunal finds that the
ethical rules of the seat of arbitration should govern, and those rules do not per-
mit any interviews or preparation of witnesses, an American attorney unaware of
this prohibition would risk a violation of those ethical rules.
6 MoDo Ruus oF PROF'I CONoucT R. 3.3 (a)(3) (2009).
7 Rogers, supra note 1, at 361.
8 Doak Bishop and Margrete Stevens, The Compelling Need for a Code of Ethics in International
Arbitration: Transparency, Integrity and Legitimacy, in ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES,
ICCA CONGRESS SI!RIns No. 15 391, 395 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 2011).
9 Id.
10 See INTERNATIONAL COi)i, OF ETHICS FOR LAWYERS PRACICING BEFORE INTERNAIiONAL ARBI-
TRAi. TRIBUNALS, in ARBrIRAnION ADvocAcY IN CHANGING TIMEs, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES No. 15 408,
417 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 2011) ("In some states (such as Mexico and Saudi Arabia) a lawyer
may make statements to the tribunal about the facts, even if this statement is not supported by any known
evidence.").
II See McMorrow, supra note 2, at 142 ("For U.S.-trained defense counsel, however, it would be
considered inappropriate not to interview and prepare a witness for the rigors of trial if there were an
opportunity to do so.").
12 Bishop and Stevens, supra note 8, at 395.
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Efforts are being made in the arbitration community to try to achieve equality
of arms-that is, to try to keep one side from having an unfair advantage because
of limitations imposed by different ethical rules. In some countries where court
cases have stated that all contact with witnesses is prohibited, such as Belgium,
France, Italy and Switzerland, specific carve-outs, or exceptions, have been made
to permit witness contact in international arbitration proceedings.' 3 Moreover,
the International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Interna-
tional Arbitration (the "IBA Rules"), which are frequently referred to for gui-
dance if not specifically adopted in an arbitration, provide in Rule 4(3) that it
shall not be improper to interview witnesses or potential witnesses and to discuss
their prospective testimony with them. 14 Thus, there is a growing consensus that
some contact between counsel and witnesses is permissible in an international
arbitration proceeding. But it is not clear that the IBA Rules will necessarily
prevail over contrary national rules that would prohibit such contact. Nor is it
clear that if the national rules of the arbitration seat prohibit contact with wit-
nesses, the carve-outs in an attorney's home country permitting such contact will
prevail over the local rules. As some commentators have noted, "[a]ttorneys'
home ethical rules continue to cast a 'shadow' that 'is omnipresent for the law-
yers and judges."" 5
So how does Rule 8.5 of The American Bar Institute ("ABA") Model Rules of
Professional Conduct apply with respect to the witness preparation situation?
Rule 8.5 has been adopted by twenty-four states in the U.S., and similar rules
have been adopted by another twenty-one states.' 6 The first premise of the rule
is that "a lawyer admitted to practice in [the] jurisdiction is subject to the discipli-
nary action of that jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct oc-
curs."' 7 Therefore, an Illinois attorney is subject to disciplinary action in Illinois
for improper conduct occurring outside Illinois.
The rule then goes on to state, "[F]or conduct in connection with a matter
pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits
are the rules to be applied [to the attorney's conduct], unless the rules of the
tribunal provide otherwise." 8 This appears to impose the rules of the seat in
most cases, unless the tribunal has its own rules.
13 See Ian Meredith and Hussain Khan, Witness Preparation in International Arbitration - A Cross
Cultural Minefield, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. September 2011, at 3 ("In court cases in Belgium,
France, Italy, and Switzerland, all contact with witnesses is prohibited.").
14 INT'L BAR Ass'N [IBA], IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
DON (2010), available at www.ibanet.org/publications IBA-guides and-free-materials-.aspx.
15 McMorrow, supra note 2, at 142; Rogers, supra note 4, at 1081.
16 See STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF MODEL RULE 8.5 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mjp/quick-guide_- 8.5.pdf.
17 MODEL RutEs oF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2009).
18 Id. R. 8.5(b)(1). Interestingly, when this rule was first adopted, it had excluded lawyers practicing
internationally, and said that international lawyers should be subject to agreements between jurisdictions
or subject to appropriate international law. However, there were not any relevant agreements between
jurisdictions or appropriate international laws that governed attorney conduct. By 2002, when the rule
was revised, international lawyers lobbied to be included. They wanted more certainty as to what rules
governed their conduct. So new Comment 7 now provides that section 8.5 (b)(1), the choice of law
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However, there may be complications in the case of witness preparation. First,
assume the tribunal sits in a country whose rule is that attorneys can have no
contact with witnesses about their testimony, and no carve-outs exist for interna-
tional arbitration. It seemingly follows that an American attorney in that case
cannot meet with the witnesses for his clients before they testify. Rule 8.5 ap-
plies the rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits. As previously noted,
however, there is an exception, permitting application of the tribunal's rules if the
tribunal has adopted different rules. So suppose that the parties and the tribunal
have agreed that the IBA Rules apply. Remember that Rule 4(3) of the IBA
Rules says it is not improper to interview witnesses and discuss their prospective
testimony with them. Thus, from the American attorney's perspective, adoption
of these rules is an improvement because they are more flexible. However, it is
still not clear whether the tribunal in the particular jurisdiction has the right to
override a local ethical rule that says there can be no contact with witnesses. So
the lawyer who decides to meet with a witness will be in accord with ABA
Model Rule 8.5, which permits application of the tribunal's rules, but may not be
in compliance with the local jurisdiction's rule.
Here is another murky issue. Even if the IBA Rules can be said to govern,
what does it mean to say one can interview the witness and discuss his prospec-
tive testimony with him? Is "interviewing" and "discussing" different from a full-
blown American "preparation of the witness," which may include extensive time
in mock examination and cross-examination? The answer is that the American
practice is probably much more extensive than what the IBA Rule envisions.
As an example, the English, although they permit contact by attorneys with
witnesses before they testify, nonetheless do not permit the same kind of interac-
tion with witnesses that American attorneys have in the normal course of their
practice. English cases have distinguished between three kinds of interactions
with witnesses: interviewing, familiarization, and coaching. 19 Interviewing is ba-
sically interaction with a witness for the purpose of obtaining evidence needed
for production of a witness statement. Familiarization involves explaining the
process and such techniques as cross-examination. The British will even permit
mock cross-examination, but only on hypothetical facts-just to help the witness
understand how cross-examination works-and not on the actual facts of the case
at hand. 20 That would be coaching. Coaching is viewed as a detailed discussion
of the specific facts in order to rehearse the witness with respect to questions
likely to be asked, and with respect to witness responses that would be appropri-
ate. Although English courts permit interviewing and familiarization, they have
expressly stated that coaching is not permitted. 21 They think a witness should
testify without that testimony having been influenced by others, and particularly
provision, applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless international law treaties or other
agreements between regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdiction provide otherwise. See Rogers,
supra note 4, at 1037 (explaining the evolution of Rule 8.5 and its express extension to transnational
activities).
19 Meredith & Khan, supra note 13, at 1.
20 Id. at 3.
21 Id. at 2.
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not by counsel. 2 2 Other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, have sim-
ilar rules including a specific prohibition on witness coaching. 2 3
So even if everyone agreed that the IBA Rules applied and allowed counsel to
talk with witnesses, in a situation where one attorney is British and another is
American, it is not clear that they will interpret the rule in the same way. Moreo-
ver, it is not clear whether one of those interpretations might lead to an ethical
violation.
In addition, in countries such as France and Switzerland, where there is now a
carve-out for contact with witnesses in an international arbitration, the proper
level of interaction between attorney and witness is not spelled out.2 4 Therefore,
attorneys from these countries do not have the same restraints found in the En-
glish system (no coaching allowed) or even in the U.S. system, in which the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct impose certain restrictions.25 Because the
restrictions on witness contact vary greatly, and because now some countries
have removed the restriction against speaking with witnesses but have not
cabined this new freedom in any way, there remains an enormous variation in
what different attorneys may perceive to be ethical conduct in dealing with
witnesses.
The drafters of ABA Model Rule 8.5 were trying to make the rule simple and
straightforward, but their concept of how things work internationally did not en-
compass the many complexities that arise from the convergence of different legal
norms and practices in international arbitration. For example, Comment 3 to Rule
8.5 states that the rule provides that any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be
subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct. That sounds good, but it
is not that simple. For example, assume the arbitral tribunal is in the U.S., but the
American attorney has to do something abroad. Further assume a deposition has
to be taken in Brazil, because a witness there cannot come to the U.S. for a
hearing. In Brazil, a civil law country, the deposition will essentially be taken by
a judge, and there will thus be a matter pending before a tribunal in Brazil. 26
Remember that the U.S. requirement under ABA Model Rule 8.5 is that attorney
conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal is governed by the
rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits. In this case, however, there will
be both a matter pending in the U.S., where the arbitral hearings are, and a matter
pending in Brazil, where the deposition is being taken under the auspices of a
22 Id. at 1.
23 Id. at 1.
24 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 7-8 (giving examples of some specific exceptions that have been
created to deal with these issues, but explaining there is still no straightforward guidance on this conflict).
25 Some restrictions include the following: Model Rule 3.3 provides that "a lawyer shall not know-
ingly. . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." Mooiut. Ruits oF PROF'L CONoucr R.
3.3(a)(3) (2009). Moreover, if a lawyer is aware that a witness has offered false material evidence he
must take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. Id. In addi-
tion, an attorney must not "falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law." Id. R. 3.4(b).
26 Rogers, supra note 4, at 1056-57.
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judge. 27 It appears that ethical rules in each jurisdiction will apply, and may well
be incompatible.
Increasingly, scholars and practitioners are urging that a uniform, binding in-
ternational code of ethics be developed for attorneys engaged in international
arbitration. 28 They urge that international rules should trump both the ethical
rules of the seat and the national ethical rules, which tend to function in a totally
different procedural and cultural context. Such international codes could be de-
veloped through international organizations, arbitral institutions, or by specific
international tribunals. In the last few years, there have been a number of initia-
tives by institutions. The American Bar Association, the International Bar Asso-
ciation, the American Society of International Law, and the International Law
Association have all begun to consider standards of conduct for lawyers practic-
ing in the field of international arbitration. 29 There is also a Code of Conduct for
European Lawyers (the CCBE), amended in 2006, which was created to address
issues of cross-border practice, but deals with arbitral proceedings in a fairly
limited fashion.30
Assuming one or more international ethics codes are developed, how might
they be enforced? Various proposals include having arbitral institutions adopt a
code of ethics, incorporate it into their rules, and thus make the code binding as a
matter of the parties' consent. 31 If the code is incorporated into the institutional
rules, it should be able to be enforced by the institution or by the tribunal.
Another approach for enforcement of ethical violations would be to have na-
tional authorities coordinate their enforcement efforts with international tribunals
that have first identified and evaluated conduct believed to be unethical.3 2
Some tribunals have viewed their power over the attorneys before them as
limited. However, Professor Catherine Rogers, one of the foremost scholars of
ethics in international arbitration, has said that adjudicatory tribunals "must have
the ability to sanction and control the behavior of attorneys appearing before
them... [T]ribunals and their rules of conduct .. .cannot be held 'captive to out-
of-state disciplinary authorities.' 33 Professor Rogers argues that arbitrators must
have not only the power to regulate the proceedings before them but also the
27 See id. (discussing the change in the rule from the term "proceeding" to "matter," which broadens
the application of the rule to depositions, thus making ethical rules of both jurisdictions apply to
depositions).
28 Rogers, supra note 1, at 350, 423; see, e.g., Doak Bishop, Ethics in International Arbitration, in
ARuIRATION AND) ADvocAcY IN CHANGING TIMES, ICCA CONGREss SERIES 15, 383, 388 (Albert Jan
van den Burg ed., 2011).
29 Bishop & Stevens, supra note 8, at 397.
30 CHARTER OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND CODE OF CONDUCr FOR
EUROPEAN LAWYERS (2010), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/index.phpid=32.
31 See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 28, at 389.
32 Rogers, supra note 4, at 1083.
33 See id. at 1085 (quoting Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice
- Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer or no Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 715, 778 (1995)).
Volume 10, Issue I Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 79
Ethics in International Arbitration
power to regulate the conduct of the attorneys who are an integral part of those
proceedings. 34
Although there are no easy solutions in this complex area of ethics in interna-
tional arbitration, it is at least conceivable that the adoption and enforcement of a
uniform code of ethics for international commercial arbitration would help bring
sunshine to a cloudy area. An international code would help provide transparency
and certainty for proper attorney conduct, help level the playing field, contribute
to the fairness of the procedure, and improve the confidence of the participants
and the public in the arbitration process.
34 Id.
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